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830 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
Insurance-Company Liability For Wrongful Death 
When Insured Murdered By Purchaser Wi:th 
No Insurable In:teres:t 
Three insurance companies negligently issued policies on the 
life of a two-year-old child to an aunt-in-law having no insur-
able interest in the child's life. A few months later, the aunt 
murdered the child.1 Plaintiff, the child's father, recovered a 
$75,000 judgment against the insurance companies for his child's 
wrongful death. Held: Judgment affirmed. The central reason 
for refusing to recognize insurance contracts where the bene-
ficiary has no insurable interest is that such contracts provide 
a motive for murder. Hence an insurance company must use 
reasonable care not to issue a life insurance policy to one with 
no insurable interest and murder oJ the insured by the "no in-
surable interest" beneficiary may accordingly be found to be a 
foreseeable consequence of failing to exercise such care. -Liberty 
Life Insurance Company v. Weldon, 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696 
(1957). 
The court's reliance on the law of insurance to support its 
holding on foreseeability seems misplaced. While statements can 
be found to the effect that the law of insurable interests is to 
some extent premised on a "temptation to murder" rationale,2 
certainly its central basis is not temptation to murder but the 
public policy against gambling. This is evident not only from 
l Dennison v. State, 259 Ala. 424, 66 So.2d 552 (1953) affirmed convic-
tion of the aunt for murder. 
2 Helmetag's Admr'x v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183 (1874). 
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the many holdings that insurance policies are freely assignable3 
but from judicial approval of other interests involving tenden-
cies quite as fatal to human life-life-tenant-remainderman and 
testator-legatee relationships,4 for example. An illustrative case 
is Chamberlain v. Butler.5 The Nebraska C-0urt, in response fo 
the argument that insurance policies may not be assigned to 
strangers because this would create a temptation to murder and 
holding insurance policies to be freely assignable stated as follows: 
. . . the same desire would exist on the part of a creditor who 
has an insurable interest, or of one who had advanced money on 
the policy, where his only hope of reimbursing himself for the 
loan might be the policy. It is exceedingly doubtful if strangers 
are anY more apt to either desire to seek to accomplish the death 
of others than are those nearly related to them.6 
Probably the holding should be viewed as merely another 
illustration of the modern judicial tendency towards expansion 
of the traditional proximate cause doctrine. Weldon7 seems quite 
irreconcilable with traditional cases such as Palsgraf8 where the 
falling of the scale was held to be a non-foreseeable consequence 
of pushing the firecracker-laden passenger. The expansion of 
proximate cause, illustrated by W eldon9 is likewise discernable 
in several other recent cases. In Genovay v. Fox, 10 for example, 
the court held a proprietor of a bowling alley-bar liable when 
the plaintiff was shot and wounded by a gunman who had been 
jumped by another patron while robbing the defendant's place 
of business. The court stated that the proprietor was under a 
duty to conduct himself so as to avoid inducing or encouraging 
resistance to the bandit if resistance reasonably appeared to en-
tail an increased risk of serious injury or death to those present.11 
a Murphy v. Reid, 64 Miss. 614, 1 So. 761 (1887), Chamberlain v. Butler, 
61 Neb. 730, 86 N.W. 48 (1901), Bray v. Malcolm, 194 Ga. 593, 22 So.2d 
126 (1942), Butterworth v. Missouri Valley Trust Co., 62 Mo. 133, 240 
S.W.2d 676 (1951). 
4 Murphy v. Reid, 64 Miss. 614, 1 So. 761 (1887), Clark v. Allen, 11 R.I. 
439 (1877). 
0 61 Neb. 730, 86 N.W. 481 (1901). 
6 Id., at 738, 482. 
7 267 Ala. 171, 100 So.2d 696 (1957). 
s Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
9 Supra, note 7. 
lo 50 N.J.Super. 598, 143 A.2d 229 (1958). 
11 The court found that the defendant intended to communicate to others 
present in the room, the availability of a concerted attack on the gun-
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That Genovay12 is itself an expansion of the traditional prox-
imate cause holdings may be seen by reference to such cases as 
Noll v. Marian.13 Plaintiff in Noll, a depositor in defendant's 
bank, was denied recovery when shot as a result of refusal by 
defendant's teller to obey a bandit's command not to move. 
This is not to suggest however, that traditional cause no-
tions are everywhere being extended. For example, in Helms 
v. Harris,14 on similar facts, plaintiff was denied recovery when 
shot as the result of the defendant's wrestling with the gµnman 
for possession of his revolver. 
In conclusion, the instant case15 seems unrealistic on its re-
liance on a supposed temptation to murder rationale of the law 
of insurable interests and is supportable, if at all, only in terms 
of the most recent foreseeability developments. 
Richard E. Petrie '60 
man by failing to open the safe on the first try, by placing the money 
across the room from the bandit, and by suggesting that the gunman 
take the remaining cash from the safe himself. 
12 Supra, note 10. 
13 347 Pa. 213, 32 A.2d 18 (1943). 
14 281 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Civ.App. 1955). 
1i; Supra, note 7. 
